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ABSTRACT  
 
 
THE OPTION ON THE TABLE: OBAMA’S RHETORIC AND THE CASE FOR 
MILITARY CONFLICT WITH IRAN 
 
Robert Jonathan Donnellan 
 
Western Carolina University (April 2013)  
 
Director: Dr. Beth Huber 
 
The following analysis seeks to demonstrate how the Obama administration, 
through its rhetoric, is attempting to build public support for a potential military 
conflict with Iran. Further, the study seeks to show how the language of the 
Obama administration rhetorically creates the reality of the foreign policy 
relationship between Iran and the United States. The study begins with a brief 
overview of the US-Iran foreign policy relationship over the course of President 
Obama’s first term. The analysis then focuses on three primary areas: the 
political myth of the inevitability of military conflict with Iran, the Just War rhetoric 
of the Obama administration, and the relationship between official-level rhetoric, 
the media, and public opinion. Finally, future possibilities of peace and military 
conflict are considered. The study analyzes official-level speeches, addresses, 
debates, and press briefings delivered between January 2012 and March 2013. 
The study of political rhetoric exposes the ways in which language informs 
foreign and military policy. Understanding the rhetorical construction of foreign 
policy relationships and exploring how public support for military conflict is 
acquired may offer insights into how military conflict could be prevented in the 
future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“On every hand, we find men...preparing themselves 
for the slaughter, even to the extent of manipulating 
the profoundest grammatical, rhetorical, and symbolic 
resources of human thought to this end.”  
--Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 
 Words are never just words. Words are symbols, the medium through 
which we think, reason, interpret and respond to the world around us. Symbols—
including not only words but sounds, gestures, and even objects—are imbued 
with meanings that somehow rise above the words, sounds, gestures, and 
objects themselves. Words and other symbols can be pieced together to form 
narratives and myths, tapestries of meaning which may evolve further into 
ideologies, which in turn affirm ways of living in relation to cultural descriptions of 
reality. Wayne C. Booth, in his manifesto The Rhetoric of Rhetoric (2004), 
describes three realities. The first deals with non-contingent realities, the second 
with non-contingent-but-changeable realities, and the third with contingent 
realities. It is Booth’s third concept of reality in which the following analysis is 
grounded, as this reality is where rhetoric happens.1 Contingent reality, as Booth 
describes it, is constructed through rhetoric, which he defines as “the whole 
range of [communicative] arts not only of persuasion but also of producing or 
reducing misunderstanding” (10). Our interpretations of events, the language 
through which and by which we interpret them, and our ability to persuasively 
                                                           
1
 Booth considers non-contingent realities to be unchangeable. His example is one of a teacup falling to 
the floor; it’s splintering into pieces is conditioned upon gravity and the materials and construction of the 
cup, which are unchangeable truths. Non-contingent-but-changeable realities, Booth argues, are “the 
history of how nature moves from contingency to contingency” (14). He gives weather-related changes in 
geography as examples. 
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communicate our interpretations create this aspect of reality in which we live. For 
Booth this can be as simple as the reality of my relationship with my significant 
other after we have just been in a fight, or as complex as the construction of war. 
Booth argues that “rhetoric makes realities” and, further, rhetoric “creates a 
multiplicity of judgments about what the realities really are” (16, emphases in 
original). Even war may arise through rhetoric. War is created through language 
structures, figures of reasoning, heuristic cues, and language surrounding 
symbols, myths, and narratives. Booth states that “the rhetoric of President Bush, 
Prime Minister Blair, and Saddam Hussein made the Iraq war of spring 2003” 
(14-15). Words accomplish action. 
 Words accomplish action, and for that reason political leaders take great 
care in choosing what they say. I will attempt to show, in the following analysis, 
that the Obama administration is saying that the US and its ally Israel are facing 
a dire threat from Iran. They are saying that Iran must not be allowed to develop 
a nuclear weapon, and that international efforts to coax Iran to scale back its 
nuclear program through diplomatic means and sanctions are not working. They 
are saying that if Iran does not meet its international obligations to halt its nuclear 
program the United States is prepared to go to war to keep Iran from developing 
a nuclear weapon. 
 While the Obama administration argues that the United States is prepared 
for a war with Iran, the US is unlikely to engage in a full-scale conventional war 
with the country for a number of reasons.2 First, over ten years of war in 
                                                           
2
 Defining what constitutes “war” is tricky. By “war,” here, I am referring to a large-scale military-to-
military confrontation. Although I use the word “war” throughout this essay, I hesitate to do so for a 
6 
 
Afghanistan and Iraq have drained the United States economically. The US has 
spent over four trillion dollars funding our military campaigns overseas. A war 
with Iran would be devastating in terms of military and civilian casualties. 
Politically, a war with Iran would strain US relations with Russia and China. War 
with Iran could potentially draw the world into another world war. A unilateral 
attack by Israel could destabilize the region and strengthen support for Iran in the 
region, though Israel would be unlikely to strike Iran without the United States’ full 
military support. Iran would be unlikely to attack Israel as well, because even if 
Iran produced a nuclear weapon and launched it at Israel, Iran would not be 
prepared to deal with an Israeli counterstrike (Brzezinski). Also, if Iran attacked 
Israel, the international community would likely sympathize with Israel, which 
could weaken Iran’s position in the region. Further, Iran is not likely to attack the 
United States, at least not directly. Iran does not have a navy or air force capable 
of bringing the fight to America’s soil. Iran does possess the capacity to strike 
other American targets. But Iran is unlikely to engage in a direct attack except in 
the case of self-defense. Again, an Iranian attack on the US or its bases would 
galvanize international support for the US and destabilize Iran’s influence in the 
region to an extent greater than sanctions have been able to accomplish.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
number of reasons. The word “war” makes the situation sound as if there are two roughly equal sides 
battling it out. Any conventional war between the United States and Iran, even if making the assumption 
that the US and Iran were the sole participants, would be asymmetrical. The amount of money the United 
Sates spends on its military is disproportionately large compared to Iran (“SIPRI Military Expenditure 
Database”). There have been a number of instances that may be considered military attacks from both 
Iran and the United States: providing financial and military support for certain groups the other nation 
considers an enemy, assassination attempts, and cyber attacks. This type of activity is likely to continue, 
and deserves further consideration.  
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 In spite of these reasons for not going to war, the Obama administration is 
threatening military conflict with Iran over its development of nuclear weapons, 
even though Iranian leaders have stated repeatedly that the purpose of Iran’s 
nuclear program is not to develop weapons but is instead a part of a peaceful 
plan to develop energy and medical technology. US leaders have good reasons 
to question the legitimacy of Iran’s words—after all it is the government’s 
responsibility to remain skeptical in order to ensure American security. However, 
the Obama administration appears to be ignoring its own intelligence when it 
comes to Iran’s intentions of building a nuclear weapon. Former Defense 
Secretary Leon Panetta stated in an interview for Meet the Press in February of 
this year, “What I've said, and I will say today, is that the intelligence we have is 
they [Iran] have not made the decision to proceed with the development of a 
nuclear weapon” (“Sec. Panetta”). When urged by Meet the Press Contributing 
Editor Chuck Todd, Panetta reiterated the statement: “I can't tell you they [Iran] 
are in fact pursuing a weapon because that's not what intelligence says they are 
doing right now.” Even though the Defense Secretary himself acknowledges that 
there is no evidence that Iran is planning to develop nuclear weapons, Obama 
and others in his administration continue to argue that Iran does intend to build a 
nuclear bomb. Further, there is evidence that the American public may be buying 
the argument. What I attempt to show in the following analysis is that, through its 
rhetoric, the Obama administration is attempting to build public support for 
military conflict with Iran. 
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 A survey by the Pew Research Center, which took place February 8-12, 
2012, found that 58% of Americans would support a war with Iran in order to 
prevent the country from developing a nuclear weapon (“Public Takes Strong 
Stance”). By November 15 of the same year, 79% of Americans cited preventing 
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon as one of the three most important goals 
for Obama during his second term in office (Saad). These data are taken from 
polls by different agencies using different questions and sampling methods. 
These data, however, match the general trend I discovered through analysis of 
the rhetoric of the Obama administration over the course of that time period. 
Official-level rhetoric became increasingly hawkish. At the same time, public 
perceptions of the importance of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear 
weapon—even if it means military conflict—rose comparatively. It may be 
impossible to determine exactly what caused such a dramatic shift in American’s 
opinions concerning the importance of halting Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear 
weapon, particularly since US intelligence indicates that Iran has no intention of 
building such weapons. The following rhetorical analysis, however, may be able 
to shed light on the relationship between American public support for military 
conflict and the rhetoric of the Obama administration. 
 In the coming chapters I will explore the rhetoric of the Obama 
administration as it attempts to construct a reality in which military conflict with 
Iran is necessary, and the persuasive aspects of Obama’s rhetoric as it pertains 
to building public support for such a conflict. In the first chapter I will briefly 
summarize US-Iranian foreign relations as they have evolved over the course of 
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Obama’s first term in office to where the US currently stands in relation to Iran. In 
Chapter Two I will look at how information shortcuts, or heuristic cues, are 
created out of language and how these shortcuts shape the way the public 
conceives of foreign relations and international events. Then, I will show how 
Obama’s rhetoric establishes and promotes a myth of inevitable military conflict 
with Iran. In the third chapter, I will examine the rhetoric of the Obama 
administration in light of establishing the principles of Just War Theory, which is a 
philosophical framework for determining the morality of going to war. The fourth 
chapter is a consideration of the relationship between elite rhetoric, the media, 
and public opinion. In Chapter Five I will look at predictions and suggestions 
about the direction US foreign policy should take concerning Iran. Finally, I will 
conclude with a summary of my findings and offer suggestions for future study.  
 For this study I analyzed speeches, debates, press briefings, and 
addresses by President Obama and members of his administration. Aside from 
the brief foreign policy background I provide in the first chapter, most of the 
official-level language I analyze comes from the period between January 2012 
and March 2013. 
 Any rhetorical analysis requires selecting some bits of language and 
discarding others. The selection process is always, at least in part, a subjective 
act. In selecting the language I have used to support my thesis I, too, rhetorically 
construct a “truth,” a truth based no more in objective reality than that of the 
foreign policy relationship between Iran and the United States. Realities are 
created through rhetoric.  
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 My intended audience, I assumed, would be skeptical of the idea that 
Obama was attempting to build public support for military conflict. The language I 
chose to include in this study reflects my attempt to appeal to my imagined 
audience. I would like to state up front that I am not convinced that President 
Obama, nor those in his administration, want to go to war with Iran. What I 
attempt to show is how Obama may be building support for military conflict, not 
that he is necessarily trying to initiate it. However, US foreign policy with the 
country is precarious. No one really knows what may happen. In order to place 
the following analysis within its particular political and historical context I will 
begin with a brief overview of the foreign policy relationship between the US and 
Iran over the course of Obama’s first term in office.  
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CHAPTER ONE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF OBAMA’S FOREIGN POLICY WITH 
IRAN  
 
 Tensions between the United States and Iran are higher now than at any 
point in the last twenty years. A 2012 poll by Gallup shows that Americans have 
consistently rated Iran as America’s greatest enemy over the last six years, 
beating out North Korea, China, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Newport). The trend 
transcends partisanship, with Republicans, Democrats, and Independents in 
agreement. Over the last year, the number of Americans citing Iran as the 
greatest enemy has continued to rise. What accounts for the growing fear of Iran 
within the American public? Is Iran as much of a threat as Americans perceive it 
to be? What is really happening between Iran and the US? 
 In 2003, Iran was at its weakest. The country was surrounded by 
aggressive US military forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran’s nuclear program was at a dead halt. Further, Iran 
was under intense international pressure to aid in the fight against terrorism. 
After being lumped in with Bush’s “axis of evil,” and recognizing its declining 
influence in the region, the Iranians attempted to open negotiations with 
Washington. In a document approved by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei, Iran sent a proposal that seemed too good to be true. Iran agreed to 
formally recognize Israel and support a two-state solution to the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict; to aid in every effort to combat terrorism, including al-
Qaeda; to end its affiliation with groups the US determined to be terrorist 
organizations, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad; and to allow full 
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access to international inspections of its nuclear program. The Bush 
administration, however, rejected the proposal with the administration’s 
characteristic hawkish and ideological response: “we don’t talk to evil” 
(“Washington ‘Snubbed’”). 
 Two major events occurred in 2005, however, which caused dramatic 
changes in Iran’s position in relation to the United States. First, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad was elected to Iran’s presidency. The intentionally incendiary tone 
of the hard-line conservative’s rhetoric against the United States, the UN, and 
Israel signaled a change from the relatively moderate tone set by the previous 
president, Mohammad Khatami. Second, Iran pledged to restart its nuclear 
program in direct violation of international pressure. These events rekindled the 
twenty-five-year-old enmity between Iran and the US.  
 The election of Barak Obama in 2008 was seen by some reformists in Iran 
as an opportunity to re-engage in direct negotiations. Obama stated in his 2009 
Inaugural address: 
To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on 
mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around 
the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's 
ills on the West, know that your people will judge you on 
what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling 
to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of 
dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but 
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that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your 
fist. (Phillips) 
There is no doubt that this section of the address is directed, at least, in part, to 
Iran. Ahmadinejad has long been an outspoken critic of the United States and 
has blamed the West for much of the ills he sees in Muslim society. Obama’s 
language in this address is, on the one hand, damning. But in comparison to 
Bush’s outright refusal to engage in any kind of negotiations with Iran, some 
Iranian reformists saw it as a step forward. That a sitting American president 
would offer to “extend a hand” in any way to Iran marked a change in attitude. 
Leaders in Iran have vocally expressed grievances over the lack of respect the 
Islamic Republic receives among the international community. Obama’s 
statement that a “new way forward” would be based on “mutual respect” 
demonstrated his willingness to listen to and address issues important to Iran.  
 A few months later, at midnight on March 20, 2009, Obama made a 
controversial move by posting a video on YouTube marking the Iranian New 
Year, Nowruz (Black). In the message, Obama appeals directly to the Iranian 
people, highlighting changes between his new administration and the 
administration of George W. Bush. "My administration,” he says, “is now 
committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us. . . .For 
nearly three decades relations between our nations have been strained. . . .But 
at this holiday we are reminded of the common humanity that binds us together.” 
In a marked change in tone from Bush’s “axis of evil” comments, Obama states: 
“This process will not be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that 
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is honest and grounded in mutual respect.” However, Obama’s New Year’s 
message was received with skepticism, according to Trita Parsi of the National 
Iranian American Council (Parsi 65-66). Parsi notes in A Single Roll of the Dice 
(2012) that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made a cautious response to Obama’s 
message, in which the Supreme Leader brought up three important doubts. 
Khamenei was unsure if Obama had the power to engage in direct diplomacy 
with Iran in the face of American political and corporate opposition. He also 
expressed skepticism about Obama’s sincerity. So far, Iran had seen a change in 
official-level rhetoric, but there were no concrete indications that American 
foreign policy would change strategically. Finally, as long as the Obama 
administration continued to pursue further sanctions, Khamenei refused to 
engage in direct diplomacy with the United States. 
 Khamenei’s fears may have been justified. Early on, the Obama 
administration adopted the dual-track strategy, a policy based on a review 
authored by US Envoy to the Middle East, Dennis Ross. Ross’s “hybrid option” 
involved a push for non-conditional engagement with Iran, backed by 
international sanctions. The inclusion of diplomacy without preconditions was a 
dramatic break form Bush’s policy of non-engagement, but the threat of 
sanctions led to skepticism among the Iranian hard-liners.  
 Despite this skepticism, the US and Iran did attempt talks a number of 
times in early 2009. An event occurred in Iran, however, which left attempts at 
direct diplomacy in the dust. The reelection of Ahmadinejad in June 2009 was 
probably the most contested election in Iran since the Revolution and the fall of 
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the shah in 1979. Ahmadinejad was challenged by Mir Hussein Mousavi, a 
political figure who denounced Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy toward the West. As 
Parsi notes, “tensions with the United States did not serve Iran’s interests, 
Mousavi believed, and Ahmadinejad had pursued an extreme policy that had 
raised tensions without bringing Iran any dividends” (82). Mousavi was seen as 
the candidate likely to unseat the current president. Ahmadinejad, however, 
through voter fraud, raids, and public and secret arrests of opposition leaders, 
and media outlets, was reelected in a landslide victory.3 When, two days after the 
election, the Supreme Leader announced that Ahmadinejad was indeed the 
winner, millions of Iranians flooded the streets of Tehran demanding justice. The 
protests that followed were brutal, with thousands arrested and dozens dead. 
While Obama initially tried to avoid taking sides in order to allow time for regime 
change in Iran from within, Obama’s political rivals and pro-Israeli groups began 
demanding a tougher approach. As Parsi notes, “By late November 2009, weeks 
before his official deadline for progress on diplomacy, President Obama gave the 
green light to the sanctions track” (151).  
 Economic sanctions may result in negative consequences in both 
philosophical and practical terms. On a philosophical level, economic sanctions 
run counter to American ethical values of democracy and human rights. Durson 
Pesken and A. Cooper Drury conducted a study from which they concluded that 
the effects of sanctions often help authoritarian rulers consolidate power and give 
them the incentive to restrict human rights and shut down political opposition, 
                                                           
3
 For more information about the Iranian election of 2009, and the resulting conflict that ensued in the 
nation, see “Chapter Six: Fraud” in Parsi’s A Single Roll of the Dice (2012). 
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which is harmful to the democratic principles on which this country was founded 
(Pesken and Drury). On a practical level, the sanctions imposed on Iran may be 
having the exact opposite effect than they are intended. Instead of pressuring 
Iran to cease enriching uranium and drop its nuclear program, the sanctions 
imposed by the US and its allies may be seen as the driving force behind Iran’s 
push to expand its nuclear capabilities. Economic sanctions have the effect of 
backing Iran into a corner, making the nation desperate to find a way of 
expanding its regional power. Possessing a nuclear weapon would put Iran in a 
better position to extend its own influence in the Middle East and beyond. 
Considering that Iran is surrounded by US military bases and naval forces it may 
be that Iran seeks a nuclear arsenal in order to defend itself from what it sees as 
a threat to its own national security.  
 But in the run up to the 2012 elections, Obama announced yet another 
round of sanctions against Iran, restricting its ability to sell oil through the help of 
foreign banks. The announcement came as Obama and his challenger Mitt 
Romney each sought to surpass the other on who could portray himself tougher 
on Iran. I am convinced that Obama’s new sanctions were not merely a political 
move designed to bolster his image at home, but were in fact in line with his new, 
more hawkish stance on Iran. In the next chapter I will try to demonstrate this 
new stance through an analysis of the Obama administration’s rhetoric. 
Specifically, I will point to the Administration’s use of rhetoric to establish reality 
and persuade Americans to support a potential military conflict with Iran. 
 
 
17 
 
 CHAPTER TWO: RHETORIC OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
 
 If, as Wayne C. Booth argues, language creates and informs reality as we 
know it, then the study of rhetoric becomes crucial to understanding how realities 
are constructed. Political leaders choose carefully the rhetoric they employ. It is 
no accident that, as I will show, a number of leaders in the Obama administration 
use a variety of nearly identical phrases and turns of speech. Leaders work 
together to frame reality through language, to rhetorically construct a way of 
understanding that they want the American people to share. By exploring the 
rhetoric of the Obama administration, I hope to shed light on the way rhetoric is 
used to promote to the American people an officially-sanctioned interpretation of 
the foreign policy relationship between the US and Iran, thus constructing the 
reality of the situation. Additionally, I hope to show how the rhetoric of the Obama 
administration is geared toward persuading Americans to support a potential 
military conflict with Iran. In this section I will explore two rhetorical strategies 
used by the Obama administration: the heuristic cues nuclear, threat, and 
regime, and the political myth of inevitable military conflict with Iran.  
 
HEURISTIC CUES 
 
 Samuel L. Popkin, in his book The Reasoning Voter: Communication and 
Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns (1994), argues that voters’ use of low-
information rationality, in the form of information shortcuts, is effective for helping 
people with little textbook knowledge to evaluate information and make informed 
decisions. Low-information rationality, as Popkin explains, is a type of “‘gut’ 
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rationality” which “draws on various information shortcuts and rules of thumb that 
voters use to obtain and evaluate information” (7). This type of reasoning, Popkin 
argues, “offer[s] people a way to connect personal and political information, to 
project that information into the future, and to make a complete picture from 
limited information” (214). 
 While I agree with the premise that Americans use information shortcuts 
instead of taking the time to study and research political issues, I disagree with 
Popkin that such shortcuts actually help people to form an accurate picture. 4 
Nonetheless, people do frequently use information shortcuts in order to make 
decisions. The problem is that arriving at a conclusion without careful 
consideration of the complexities of a particular situation or event opens the door 
to being manipulated. Political leaders recognize the effectiveness of targeting 
citizens’ propensity for low-information rationality. That is why they encourage the 
repetition of succinct phrases and slogans as a method of persuasion. If a 
complex concept is compressed into a terse statement or idea and is repeated 
often enough, many people will come to see it as a reflection of reality. Through 
this process heuristic cues are constructed. A heuristic is a commonsense rule 
that guides people in learning, solving problems, and making decisions. Leaders, 
through language, can create heuristic cues to manipulate the way people 
interpret and respond to information. For example, instead of referring to what 
the military calls chemical and biological agents in the buildup to the Iraq War, 
the Bush administration made a point to use the phrase weapons of mass 
                                                           
4
 A number of political scientists disagree with Popkin’s ideas. See Bartels’s “The Irrational Electorate” for 
an in-depth counterargument to Popkin’s claims.  
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destruction (Zoglin and Novack). Weapons of mass destruction sounds more 
fierce and dangerous than the technical-sounding nomenclature used by the 
military. The phrase caught on in the media, which repeated it endlessly. The 
phrase proved exceptionally effective at heightening the sense of urgency that 
the Bush administration relied upon to gain popular support for war. In this 
section I will demonstrate how the Obama administration has constructed three 
information shortcuts with which to guide the low-information rationality on which 
many Americans rely, the heuristic cues: nuclear, threat, and regime.  
 Early on in Obama’s first term, the Obama administration made an effort 
to change the tone in Washington. In “Ten Years On: Obama’s War on Terrorism 
in Rhetoric and Practice” (2011), political scientist Trevor McCrisken explains that 
President Obama made a conscious decision to reframe the narrative of the war 
on terror. McCrisken argues that Obama wanted to change the George W. Bush-
era ideology associated with the phrase. One way that McCrisken argues that 
Obama did this is by establishing new narratives of nuclear disarmament and 
non-proliferation. But, cautions McCrisken, “while the message has changed . . . 
the policies have shifted less” (782). Obama may have made a point to stop 
using the phrase “war on terror,” but he continues to use language which may 
have the effect of manipulating the public to see Iran and Obama’s policies 
toward the country in a certain light.  
 First is the association of the nation of Iran and the term nuclear. The word 
nuclear brings to mind images of the Cold War arms race, WWII, and explosions 
at Fukushima and Three-Mile Island. Nuclear is not a value-free word, but is 
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instead loaded with negative connotations. In the third presidential debate during 
the 2012 election cycle, President Obama stated “as long as I’m President of the 
United States, Iran will not get a nuclear weapon” (“Remarks by the President 
and Governor Romney”). In making this assertion Obama assumes that Iran is 
seeking to build a nuclear weapon, even though there is no intelligence 
supporting the assumption and Iran has always insisted that its nuclear program 
is for the peaceful production of energy and medical technology. Some leaders in 
Washington, however, are convinced that Iran is attempting to build a nuclear 
weapon which, of course, is the crux of the conflict between the US and Iran. 
Both candidates in the third presidential debate repeatedly associated the words 
Iran and nuclear. Obama and Mitt Romney together used the phrase “nuclear 
Iran” or “nuclear-capable Iran” six times in the debate. Using nuclear as a 
modifier for the word Iran establishes in the audience an association of these 
words, an association which over time may stick in people’s minds and 
manipulate the way they think about the nation of Iran.  
 The Obama administration also used the association in speeches aimed 
at an international audience. Both President Obama and former Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta used this association in their addresses to the American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a pro-Israeli lobbying group, in early 
March 2012. Together they made the connection six times, using such phrases 
as “nuclear-armed Iran,” “Iran’s nuclear program,” and “an Iranian nuclear 
weapon” (“Remarks by the President at AIPAC,” “Defense Secretary”). Obama 
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also referred to “a nuclear-armed Iran” at the meeting of the UN General 
Assembly on September 25, 2012 (“Remarks by the President to the UN”).  
  The association of the words nuclear and Iran collapses two meanings 
that can be associated with the word nuclear—nuclear weapons and nuclear 
energy. By collapsing these meanings, the Obama administration may be 
creating a heuristic cue. If the phrase nuclear Iran comes to have only one 
possible meaning—an Iran that possesses nuclear weapons—then the Obama 
administration has created a heuristic for Americans to use when considering 
their support for military conflict with Iran, whether that was Obama’s intention or 
not.  
 Another problematic combination of terms is the association of Iran with 
the word threat. What constitutes a threat? Does the vitriolic rhetoric coming from 
Iran alone constitute a threat to the United States? Perhaps so, inasmuch as 
American rhetoric constitutes a threat to Iran. But, as noted earlier, Iran is 
unlikely to attack the US or Israel, even if the country were to possess a nuclear 
weapon. In the third presidential debate, both President Obama and Governor 
Romney went to great lengths to portray Iran as a threat. Romney stated: “The 
greatest threat of all is Iran,” and “Iran is the greatest national security threat we 
face.” Further, Romney declared that “with regards to Iran and the threat of 
Iran—there’s no question but that a nuclear Iran, a nuclear-capable Iran is 
unacceptable to America. It presents a threat not only to our friends, but 
ultimately a threat to us to have Iran have nuclear material, nuclear weapons that 
could be used against us or used to be threatening to us.” Here Romney 
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connects Iran, nuclear, and threat, producing multiple associations at once. 
Perhaps the most vitriolic language Romney uses in regards to Iran is when he 
promises “I’d make sure that Ahmadinejad is indicted under the genocide 
convention. His words amount to genocide incitation.” Here, Romney appears to 
concede that words themselves may constitute more than a threat; they have the 
potential to incite, or bring about, genocide. Romney appears to agree with 
Booth’s idea that reality is created rhetorically. Through powerful and persuasive 
language events can be set in motion which establish and alter the reality of 
those who experience them.  
 Obama’s rhetoric in the debate was just as hawkish as Romney’s. The 
first time Obama mentioned Iran in the third presidential debate is when he 
boasts to Governor Romney about “dealing with the Iranian threat,” making an 
immediate connection between the words Iran and threat (“Remarks by the 
President and Governor Romney”). Here is Obama’s explanation of why Iran is a 
threat to the United States:  
[A] nuclear Iran is a threat to our national security and it’s a threat 
to Israel’s national security. We cannot afford to have a nuclear 
arms race in the most volatile region in the world. Iran is a state 
sponsor of terrorism, and for them to be able to provide nuclear 
technology to non-state actors, that’s unacceptable. And they have 
said that they want to see Israel wiped off the map. (“Remarks by 
the President and Governor Romney”) 
23 
 
Obama declares that Iran is a “state sponsor of terrorism,” a rhetorical 
appellation which may manipulate the way Americans think about Iran. “State 
sponsor of terrorism,” however, is a title that, while rhetorically powerful, may just 
as easily be applied to the United States as Iran. Two of the items in the 2011 
Country Reports on Terrorism which designated Iran as a state sponsor of terror 
were a state-sanctioned assassination attempt on the Saudi Ambassador in 
Washington, and providing support for resistance groups fighting what they see 
as an illegitimate government (United States). If scrutinized under the same 
parameters, the US would also be considered a state sponsor of terror, both for 
Obama’s “kill list,” his approved list of people—including American citizens—
targeted for assassination (Becker and Shane), and for providing support to 
Syrian rebels as they attempt to overthrow the existing order (Hosenball). As for 
the arms race Obama refers to, it has already begun. Israel already possesses 
nuclear weapons. Further, there is no indication that Iran is planning to “provide 
nuclear technology to non-state actors,” as Obama claims (“Remarks by the 
President and Governor Romney”). And like Romney, Obama also indirectly 
supports the idea that national security threats may be the result of rhetorical 
constructions when he states that “they [Iran] have said that they want to see 
Israel wiped off the map.” Obama and Romney both appear to imply that 
language can constitute a threat to national security.  
 Obama’s language in the third presidential debate signaled a new tone as 
he attempted to out-hawk Romney in displaying a tougher stance on Iran. 
Clearly, the display was intended for an American audience as he sought 
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reelection. This kind of verbal conflict plays well with an American audience. I 
argue that the polls showing an increase in the American public’s perception of 
Iran as the nation’s greatest national security threat, as I explained on page 7, 
demonstrate the effect such rhetoric can have on its audience.  
 A third problematic coupling is referring to Iran’s government as a regime. 
During the speech Obama gave to AIPAC in 2012, he used the phrase “Iranian 
regime” five times (“Remarks by the President at AIPAC”). The White House 
spokesperson, Press Secretary Jay Carney, referred to “the Iranian regime” and 
“the regime in Tehran” in at least three early 2013 press briefings (“Press Briefing 
by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 1/31/2013,” “Press Briefing by Press Secretary 
Jay Carney, 2/1/2013,” “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 
2/21/2013”). Even the Deputy Press Secretary, at a press gaggle on February 
14, 2013, used the phrase “the Iranian regime” (“Press Gaggle”). Regime and 
government are in many cases used synonymously. Regime, however, refers to 
the overarching political system, and government refers to the various forms of 
rule within a regime. For example, a country could have successive 
governments, but the nation’s liberal democratic regime may remain unchanged. 
Regime change comes about when the fundamental political system undergoes 
change.  
 The word regime, however, serves a rhetorical purpose when used by the 
Obama administration. Though the words may be used synonymously, regime 
and government each have a different connotation. Put simply, regime is most 
frequently used to refer to countries the United States does not like. Americans 
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do not refer to their government as “the American regime” or “the regime in 
Washington,” unless, of course, a member of one political party wishes to 
demonize the other. Also seldom heard is “the regime in France” or “the 
Canadian regime.” No, the word regime is normally reserved for countries such 
as Syria, North Korea, Iran, and other countries the United States sees as not 
conforming to the wishes and foreign policy of the United States. Using the 
heuristic cue regime does the rhetorical work of creating an “other” of Iran, 
demonizing not only its form of government, but the country, the culture, and its 
people as well. The use of the heuristic cue regime may change the way 
Americans perceive Iran, making it easier for leaders to gain public support for a 
potential military conflict. 
 These identifications of Iran with nuclear, threat, and regime form heuristic 
cues for an American audience to follow. These cues are repeated relentlessly, 
and are therefore likely to stick in people’s minds. When Iran is mentioned in a 
news conference or speech, members of the Obama administration can be sure 
that Americans have on hand a well-stocked arsenal of heuristics with which to 
interpret the language in whatever way that the Administration sees fit. Providing 
these cues to the public ensures that the Administration can influence reality as 
Americans perceive it and manipulate the way Americans think and act toward 
Iran.  
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THE MYTH OF INEVITABLE MILITARY CONFLICT WITH IRAN 
 
 
 Heuristic cues are an example of a rhetorical strategy the Obama 
administration may use to inform American perceptions. Political myths represent 
another strategy for constructing reality and building public support for political 
objectives. Trita Parsi, in his book A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy 
with Iran (2012) argues that a narrative is taking hold in America in which 
diplomacy with Iran has been exhausted. “Acceptance of this narrative,” he writes 
in his preface,  
 would result in limiting Washington’s options on Iran to various 
forms of confrontation—that is, either continued sanctions and 
containment or military action. In view of the failure of sanctions 
and containment thus far, that policy option is arguably not stable 
and will eventually deteriorate into military confrontation as well. (x) 
The narrative of which Parsi speaks appears to be manifesting itself as a political 
myth. Political myths are narratives through which people come to understand 
and give meaning to their experiences and the political conditions in which they 
live. Political myths contribute to the justification of war through presidential 
rhetoric (Merskin, Rojecki, Williamson), policy legitimization (Collet, Esch) and 
popular imagery (Cloud). There are some instances in which political myth may 
contribute to peace (Ivie and Giner), though there is less academic research in 
this area. In this section I will seek to show how President Obama and his 
administration have, particularly over the last year, invoked a myth of inevitable 
military conflict in official-level rhetoric.  
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 There are three elements to the myth: 
1. Diplomacy has been tried, but it has failed, 
2. Sanctions have proven ineffective, therefore, 
3. The only remaining option is military action.  
 The Obama administration insists that it wants to pursue diplomacy as a 
solution to its standoff with Iran. Obama stated at his address to the UN on 
September 25, 2012: “America wants to resolve this issue through diplomacy, 
and we believe that there is still time and space to do so” (“Remarks by the 
President to the UN”). At a news conference shortly after his reelection, Obama 
stated: “I very much want to see a diplomatic resolution to the problem,” “I think 
there is still a window of time for us to resolve this diplomatically,” and “I will try to 
make a push in the coming months to see if we can open up a dialogue between 
Iran and not just us, but the international community, to see if we can get this 
things resolved” (“Remarks by the President in a News Conference”). Biden 
stated at a security conference in Munich, “There is still time, there is still space 
for diplomacy, backed by pressure, to succeed” (Biden). Jay Carney, in a press 
briefing on February 21, 2013, said, “we believe there is still time to resolve this 
issue diplomatically,” and “the window remains open for this to be resolved 
diplomatically” (“Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 2/21/2013”).  
 However, the administration’s insistence that they want to pursue 
diplomacy is usually followed by admonitions or warnings. Obama’s above 
statement to the UN was followed by: “But that time is not unlimited.” His 
comments at the news conference were followed with: “We’re not going to let 
28 
 
Iran get a nuclear weapon,” “We’ve imposed the toughest sanctions in history. It 
is having an impact on Iran’s economy,” and “we’re not going to be constrained 
by diplomatic niceties or protocols.” Biden’s comment, “There is still time, there is 
still space for diplomacy, backed by pressure, to succeed,” includes within it the 
phrase “backed by pressure,” which seems to contradict the spirit of diplomacy. 
Carney’s statement in the press briefing mentioned above—“we believe there is 
still time to resolve this issue diplomatically”—is shortly followed up with: “If [Iran] 
fails to address the concerns of the international community, it will face more 
pressure and become increasingly isolated.” His comment, that “the window 
remains open for this to be resolved diplomatically,” is followed up with: “but that 
window will not remain open indefinitely.”  
 The Obama administration claims, on the one hand, to seek diplomacy in 
good faith, but on the other hand, the administration seems to follow up its 
statements on diplomacy with threats or warnings, which only creates distance 
between Washington and Iran. These claims to diplomacy may, however, build 
on the myth of inevitable military conflict with Iran in that they show, at least on 
the surface, that the Obama administration has sincerely tried its hand at 
negotiating with Iran.  
 But there are some who are already declaring that diplomacy has failed. 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently announced that he believes 
Iran is only agreeing to hold talks (referring to the P5+1 talks in Kazakhstan on 
Feb. 26-27, 2013) in order to buy time for developing a nuclear weapon 
(Williams). Israeli hawks favor a preemptive strike against Iran, and there are 
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some in Washington who agree. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) 
introduced a bi-partisan resolution in February 2013 which “Urges that if Israel is 
compelled to take military action in self-defense, the United States will stand with 
Israel and provide diplomatic, military, and economic support in its defense of its 
territory, people, and existence” (Graham). The resolution, if passed, states that 
the US will back Israel if it takes military action against Iran in self-defense. 
However, if Israel considers a preemptive strike as a form of self-defense, as 
Bush did in the lead-up to the war in Iraq, the US could be drawn into war with 
Iran. Israel believes that diplomacy is already exhausted—if the Obama 
administration sides with Israel on this, there may be little or no time left to 
pursue negotiations.  
 The second part of the myth involves the ineffectiveness of sanctions. The 
Obama administration frequently boasts about the sanctions imposed on Iran 
since Obama took office. Here is a sample: 
• “[Against Iran] we’ve put in the toughest, most crippling sanctions 
ever.” (“Remarks by the President and Governor Romney”)  
•  “We’ve imposed the toughest sanctions in history. It is having an 
impact on Iran’s economy.” (“Remarks by the President in a News 
Conference”) 
•  “The United States, the European Union and the United Nations 
imposed what Iran—the Iranian leaders are acknowledging to be 
the most robust sanctions in history.” (Biden) 
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• “The issue with Iran is we have pursued a policy that has imposed 
upon that country the most severe sanctions regime in history with 
significant economic consequences.” (“Press Briefing by Press 
Secretary Jay Carney, 1/31/2013”) 
• “Iran is suffering under a sanctions regime that is more strict and 
more universally applied than any in history, and a regime that’s 
having a real impact—a negative impact on the Iranian economy 
and on its political structure.” (“Press Briefing by Press Secretary 
Jay Carney, 2/21/2013”) 
Here we see in official-level rhetoric Obama’s “dual-track” policy toward Iran, 
diplomacy backed by the pressure of sanctions. The problem is that unless the 
dual-track approach convinces Iran to open its nuclear program to international 
inspection, which it has not, the Obama administration will have backed itself into 
a corner. If the sanctions against Iran have been the toughest in history, and yet 
Iran has so far refused to budge, then what options remain? Here we come to the 
third element of the myth, the inevitability of military conflict. 
 The euphemism for a military attack against Iran is the well-known phrase 
“all options on the table,” the “option” of military conflict. To AIPAC in March 
2012, Obama declared: “I have said that when it comes to preventing Iran from 
obtaining a nuclear weapon, I will take no options off the table, and I mean what I 
say” (“Remarks by the President at AIPAC”). To the UN in 2012 Obama 
declared, “the United States will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining 
a nuclear weapon” (“Remarks by the President to the UN”). In the third 
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presidential debate, Obama stated, “[Iran] can take the diplomatic route and end 
their nuclear program, or they will have to face a united world and a United 
States President—me—who said we’re not going to take any options off the 
table,” and “we are going to take all options necessary to make sure they don't 
have a nuclear weapon” (“Remarks by the President and Governor Romney,” 
emphasis mine).5 Panetta said to AIPAC, “We will keep all options – including 
military action – on the table to prevent them from obtaining a nuclear weapon” 
(“Defense Secretary”). Carney stated at his press conference on January 31, 
2013, “the President has also made clear that when it comes to Iran’s 
development of nuclear weapons, that all options remain on the table” (“Press 
Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 1/31/2013”). It is hard to know what form 
military action against Iran could take. It could be continued cyber attacks against 
Iran’s technological infrastructure, targeted drone strikes, a ground war, or any 
number of other military actions. It is clear, however, that these statements, when 
taken together, demonstrate the myth of inevitable military conflict with Iran.  
  The myth is presented most clearly during the third presidential debate in 
2012. Obama warns:  
 The clock is ticking. We’re not going to allow Iran to perpetually 
engage in negotiations that lead nowhere. And I’ve been very clear 
to them. Because of the intelligence coordination that we do with a 
range of countries, including Israel, we have a sense of when they 
would get breakout capacity, which means that we would not be 
able to intervene in time to stop their nuclear program. And that 
                                                           
5
 All italics within the following quotes in this section are the author’s emphases, unless otherwise noted. 
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clock is ticking. (“Remarks by the President and Governor 
Romney”) 
“The clock is ticking” implies that some type of action is inevitable. It implies a 
deadline, after which some type of drastic action must be taken. The action is the 
intervention of which Obama speaks, which must happen before Iran reaches a 
point where it could develop a nuclear weapon. The statement “We’re not going 
to allow Iran to perpetually engage in negotiations that lead nowhere “shows that 
Obama lacks faith in the diplomatic process, or at least in Iran’s sincerity in 
resolving the issue diplomatically. Taken in conjunction with Senator Graham’s 
resolution on providing unrestrained military support to Israel and Israel’s 
insistence on preemptive strikes, we may have a scenario in which diplomacy is 
considered failed and military conflict with Iran becomes inevitable. Obama 
invokes the entirety of the myth in this passage from the same debate: 
So the work that we’ve done with respect to sanctions now offers 
Iran a choice: They can take the diplomatic route and end their 
nuclear program, or they will have to face a united world and a 
United States President—me—who said we’re not going to take 
any options off the table. (“Remarks by the President and Governor 
Romney”) 
Here Obama provides a map of the myth. With regards to sanctions, the US has 
done all it can. Regarding diplomacy, Obama pushes the responsibility onto Iran 
because the US has done all it can—there is no more room for US leadership in 
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negotiations. Finally, “we’re not going to take any options off the table” signals 
the end of the myth—a military solution to the standoff.  
 As stated previously, I am not convinced that Obama wants a war with 
Iran. However, if the myth of inevitable military conflict takes hold with the 
American public then Obama will have gone a long way towards framing the 
perceived reality of the situation between the US and Iran, and towards 
persuading the American public to support him should he choose to engage Iran 
militarily. Trough the myth of inevitable military conflict with Iran the Obama 
administration has established for the American public the necessity of a 
potential military conflict. But, in order to solidify public support, Obama will need 
to do more than establish the necessity; he will have to demonstrate the morality 
of such a military conflict as well. In the next section I will attempt to show how 
the Obama administration has shaped its rhetoric in such a way as to promote 
the morality of potential military conflict with Iran. 
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CHAPTER THREE: JUST WAR RHETORIC 
 
 Just War Theory is a philosophical framework for determining the morality 
of war.6 Just War Theory has its roots in antiquity. Thomas Aquinas, building on 
the work of previous philosophers including St. Augustine, laid the groundwork 
for Just War Theory as we know it today. He established the principles of 
legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention in response to his question “Is 
it always a sin to wage war?” (Aquinas). It is morally permissible, Aquinas 
argued, to engage in war as long as these principles are met. Modern 
philosophers have built upon these principles to construct an expanded 
framework. Though there are multiple Just War theories the many variations can 
be simmered down into three basic categories: jus ad bellum (the justice of 
engaging in war), jus in bello (just conduct in war), and jus post bellum (justice 
after the war). Of these I am only concerned with the first, jus ad bellum, as I am 
interested only in the possibility of entering into military conflict.  
 Contemporary philosopher Nicolas Fotion, in his book War and Ethics: A 
New Just War Theory (2007), provides a generic formulation of the many Just 
War theories in order to form a basis from which to build on his own model of 
Just War Theory. His model does not appear to be widely accepted, but I will 
borrow his generic version in order to demonstrate the major principles as I need 
only a basic framework for the rhetorical analysis which is to follow. The major 
                                                           
6
 I have written on the implications of Just War Theory before. See: 
Donnellan, Robert. “The Justification of War: Medieval Roots and Just War Theory Today.” The War 
Crimes Times  3.1 [Asheville, NC] Winter 2011: 10-11. Print. 
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principles of the ad bellum aspects of the various Just War theories can be 
summarized as follows: 
  Jus ad bellum 
1. Legitimate Authority 
2. Just Cause 
3. Right Intention 
4. Last Resort 
5. Proportionality 
6. Likelihood of Success 
 The legitimate authority principle provides that a war is only just if it is 
declared by a governing body acting with legitimate authority. It is generally held 
that non-state actors and governments deemed illegitimate cannot justly engage 
in war. Just cause indicates that going to war is only morally permissible if the 
attacking nation is responding to current or recent attacks to itself or its allies. 
The right intention principle, which is related to just cause, requires that nations 
waging war must do so only for sake of justice or self-defense, not merely out of 
self-interest. Nations can only wage war as a last resort. The last resort principle 
requires that all efforts have been made to find an alternative solution to the 
problem before declaring war or engaging in warfare. Proportionality, in the ad 
bellum, pre-war sense, requires that the benefits of waging war vastly outweigh 
the costs, both in economic terms and in terms of lives lost. Lastly, a nation is 
only justified in going to war if there is ample likelihood of success. Sending 
soldiers into harm’s way with no chance of victory is simply untenable. Following 
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these principles, it is argued, reduces the likelihood of a nation waging an 
unjustified war.  
 Just War Theory is based within liberal political theory and its emphasis on 
neutrality, rationality, and universality. There are a number of practical, ethical, 
and political criticisms of Just War Theory (Ben-Porath; Burke, Anthony; 
Calhoun; Kamm; Poe). Further, there are a number of criticisms of liberal political 
theory itself, both as it applies to public discourse (Roberts-Miller) and 
justification of political violence (Held). Just War Theory, however, remains the 
dominant method US leaders use to justify the morality of waging war, if only as 
window-dressing to get the American public on board with an otherwise 
unjustifiable war, as Joseph M. Schwartz claims was the case in George W. 
Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Schwartz).   
 Most scholars use the framework of Just War Theory in hindsight, 
determining the just or unjust nature of war after it has already happened. I 
argue, however, that looking at the way official-level rhetoric promotes or 
corresponds with Just War Theory principles may shed light on where the United 
States stands in relation to the potential for military conflict with its enemies. In 
this section I will attempt to demonstrate how the rhetoric of the Obama 
administration promotes a number of the Just War Theory principles in relation to 
US-Iranian relations, and how meeting these principles may provide Obama the 
public support he needs if he makes the decision to go to engage in military 
conflict with Iran.  
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 The legitimate authority principle holds that a war that is declared by an 
illegitimate entity, that is, a person or group which does not have the legal 
authorization to declare war, that war is considered unjust. The legitimate 
authority principle can get muddy, however, when considering the role of 
international governing bodies such as the UN—in the case of governments 
acting unilaterally, for example. The principle is further muddied when 
considering the role of internal groups when attempting to overthrow the existing 
order, such as in the case of revolutionary wars. In any case, the rhetoric of the 
Obama administration suggests that the US is attempting to portray the Iranian 
government as illegitimate, thus ensuring that any action taken by Iran can be 
framed as unjust.  
 The strongest case for this can be seen in the way the Obama 
administration has consistently referred to the Iranian government as a regime, 
which I discussed previously. Using a term such as regime to describe a nation’s 
governing body may suggest that the government of that nation is illegitimate. 
But further evidence of the Obama administration’s effort to portray the Iranian 
government as illegitimate can be seen in several press releases given by Press 
Secretary Jay Carney. When Carney was asked, during a press briefing on 
January 31, 2013, whether President Obama considers the government of Iran to 
be “legitimate and elected,” Carney responded by saying, “The fact is we judge 
Iran by its behavior—not by its words, but by its actions—and they are 
consistently in violation of their United Nations obligations, their international 
obligations. . . .It is the government that continues to flout its international 
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obligations, and that behavior is illegitimate” (“Press Briefing by Press Secretary 
Jay Carney, 1/31/2013”). The following day Carney reiterated his comments: “We 
judge the regime in Tehran by its behavior, by its flagrant violation of its 
international obligations. That behavior is certainly illegitimate” (“Press Briefing 
by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 2/1/2013”). On February 21, 2013, Carney said, 
“the actions taken by Iran that represent a continuation of their refusal to abide by 
their international obligations are hardly a surprise” (“Press Briefing by Press 
Secretary Jay Carney, 2/21/2013”). In these briefings to the press Carney 
emphasizes the illegitimacy of the Iranian government by referring to it as a 
regime and by saying the government’s behavior is illegitimate. Directly denying 
the legitimacy of a nation’s government can be a dangerous move. A frequent 
criticism of Iran’s leaders is Ahmadinejad’s refusal to recognize Israel as a 
nation. Carney is careful not to directly state that Iran’s government is illegitimate, 
but substituting the idea that Iran’s “behavior” is illegitimate has the same 
rhetorical effect as far as presenting the case to an American audience. Notice 
also the repetition of the idea that Iran is in violation of its United Nations 
obligations. Not only is the Iranian government itself illegitimate, but it is also 
acting against the United Nations. This can be seen as a further attempt to 
portray Iran as acting without legal authority.  
 The just cause principle is necessary for determining whether a nation has 
good reasons for going to war. Good reasons include responding to “imminent, 
present, or recent acts of aggression” (Fotion 19). This may also include 
imminent, present, or recent attacks to a nation’s allies. The key to determining 
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whether a nation has just cause for going to war depends on definitions of 
imminent and aggression.  
 An imminent threat would justify a military strike. But what does imminent 
mean? Does it mean that the opposing nation or group is preparing to attack, 
getting ready to attack, or in the process of attacking? In what stage does the 
opposing force need to be in order to justify attacking it? Colin S. Gray, Professor 
of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 
England, describes a preemptive war as “to strike first (or attempt to do so) in the 
face of an attack that is either already underway or is very credibly imminent” 
(Gray v). He defines a precautionary war as “one waged not out of strong 
conviction that a dangerous threat is brewing in the target state, but rather 
because it is suspected that such a threat might one day emerge, and it is better 
to be safe than sorry (Gray vi). A preventive war falls somewhere in the middle. 
The Bush administration employed what it described as preemptive attacks 
against Iraq, but in reality the Bush doctrine promoted a preventive agenda. The 
invasion of Iraq initiated a preventive war, attacking the nation before Iraq had a 
chance to develop the ability to carry out an attack against the US or its allies. 
Such appears to be the case with the Obama administration and Iran. Obama 
has said again and again that the US will not allow Iran to develop a nuclear 
weapon, even threatening a military attack on the country if it continues to 
develop its nuclear program. Israel is calling for a “preemptive” (but really, 
preventive) war against Iran, before a threat can emerge (Williams). It remains to 
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be seen whether Obama will follow the Bush Doctrine and Israel’s calls and 
initiate a preventive war with Iran.  
 The other definition critical to determining whether a nation has just cause 
in going to war involves the definition of aggression. Depending on how leaders 
choose to define aggression, it could mean anything from vitriolic rhetoric to an 
assassination attempt to a full-blown military attack. According to the State 
Department’s 2011 “Country Reports on Terrorism” Iranian leaders were linked to 
a foiled plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington (United States). 
An attempted assassination is clearly an aggressive act, perhaps justifying a 
counterattack. But, again, the problem with the just cause principle is that nearly 
anything can be considered an act of aggression. The reality is that all groups 
claim just cause for their attacks. Whether the attacks are actually just is a matter 
of interpretation.  
 The third Just War Theory principle is right intention. According to Fotion, 
right intention is tied not to a nation’s motives for entering a war, but with the 
nation’s intentions, which he claims have more to do with the action associated 
with the motive (16-18). For example, one could claim that George Herbert 
Walker Bush had right intention when, after repelling the Iraqi military from 
Kuwait in 1991, he halted the advance and did not continue on to invade Iraq. In 
that case, it could be argued that the motive was to defend Kuwait, and the 
intention was to take the action necessary to accomplish the goal. A nation 
whose actions take them beyond their original intent and go on to occupy or 
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exploit the enemy nation for the aggressor’s own advantage would have wrong 
intention.  
 Obama has not directly addressed the principle of right intention. The only 
indicator that he is attempting to establish the justness of his intent is in the State 
of the Union address early in 2013, where he seeks to portray the United States 
as a nation that abides by values which ensure that the intentions behind any 
military action is just. He said: 
And where necessary, through a range of capabilities, we will 
continue to take direct action against those terrorists who pose the 
gravest threat to Americans. (Applause.) Now, as we do, we must 
enlist our values in the fight. That's why my administration has 
worked tirelessly to forge a durable legal and policy framework to 
guide our counterterrorism efforts. Throughout, we have kept 
Congress fully informed of our efforts. I recognize that in our 
democracy, no one should just take my word for it that we’re doing 
things the right way. So in the months ahead, I will continue to 
engage Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention 
and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and 
system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more 
transparent to the American people and to the world. (“Remarks by 
the President in the State”) 
 Unfortunately, as Fotion notes, right intention can only really be 
determined after the action has taken place. As with just cause, all nations claim 
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they have the right intent going into a conflict, and therefore it is impossible to 
predict exactly what intentions Obama might have were a military conflict to 
break out. We will not know for sure unless and until that conflict is underway. 
 The last resort principle holds that all other available options should be 
exhausted before making the decision to go to war. Every opportunity for 
diplomacy and negotiation must be employed and exhausted before any direct 
military engagement should take place. President Obama and some members of 
his administration appear to support this principle. Obama stated during the third 
presidential debate, “The disagreement I have with Governor Romney is that 
during the course of this campaign, he’s often talked as if we should take 
premature military action. I think that would be a mistake, because when I’ve sent 
young men and women into harm’s way, I always understand that that is the last 
resort, not the first resort” (“Remarks by the President and Governor Romney,” 
emphasis mine). To AIPAC in March 2012 Obama said: “I will only use force 
when the time and circumstances demand it” (“Remarks by the President at 
AIPAC”). Joe Biden, during his debate with Paul Ryan, stated bluntly, “War 
should always be the absolute last resort” (“Vice Presidential Debate”).  
 Obama and Biden both argue that war should be the last resort, after 
diplomacy has failed. As I showed in the previous chapter, however, the rhetoric 
of the Obama administration suggests that diplomacy has already failed, or at the 
very least the window of opportunity for diplomacy is closing. At what point will 
the Obama administration consider the window closed? At the recent P5+1 
(Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States plus Germany) talks in 
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Kazakhstan, talks with Iran ended with no real progress, but a future meeting 
was set for April 5-6, 2013, to try it again. Shortly before the meetings took place, 
Jay Carney was asked during a press conference: “Chris Van Hollen [Democratic 
Representative from Maryland] just said that these talks that are coming up next 
week are the last best chance to resolve this issue in a peaceful manner. Does 
the President, does the administration share that view? And are these talks the 
last best chance?” In his response Carney largely dodged the question, instead 
repeating the worn refrains, “the United States is determined to prevent Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon,” and “the window remains open for this to be 
resolved diplomatically, but that window will not remain open indefinitely” (“Press 
Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 2/21/2013”).  
 The more the myth of inevitable military conflict takes hold, the easier it 
will be for Obama to declare the window closed. But part of the problem with the 
last resort principle is that unless a country is attacking or on the verge of 
attacking, there is always the possibility of another shot at diplomacy. The last 
resort principle stands at odds with doctrines of preventive or precautionary war. 
If a nation goes on the offensive before an enemy attack “is either already 
underway or is very credibly imminent” then there must be, by definition, at least 
one more opportunity to negotiate and thereby avoid military conflict. The case 
for truly preemptive war is a little trickier, but, as I’ve shown, Obama’s policies 
seem not to differ much from Bush’s. Were Obama to follow George W. Bush’s 
and Israel’s lead and conduct a preventive or precautionary war, even were he to 
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meet all other Just War Theory principles, he would be in violation of the Just 
War Theory principle of last resort.  
 The fifth Just War Theory principle is proportionality. To adhere to this 
principle, a nation would have to perform a cost-benefit analysis to see if war 
makes sense, in terms of lives lost, the economic burden associated with war, 
and the potential harm done to the nation’s own people and infrastructure. To be 
morally permissible, the benefits of war must outweigh the costs. This may be the 
toughest principle for the Obama administration to sell to the American people. 
The United States is in an economic slump since the financial crisis of 2008. 
Americans are weary of over a decade of war; many service-members lives have 
been lost yet there is little to show for the sustained military effort. Perhaps it is 
for this reason—the difficulty of persuading Americans that the benefits of military 
conflict outweigh the costs—that Obama is pushing for alternatives to direct 
conventional warfare, including targeted killings, drone strikes, and cyber attacks. 
But, once ground forces have been removed from Afghanistan, as Obama has 
pledged to do within the coming year, and as the economy slowly improves, 
gaining public support for the proportionality principle may become easier for 
Obama to achieve.  
  Finally, the likelihood of success principle demands that there must be at 
least a chance that a military confrontation could be successful. It would be 
unjust for leaders to send their troops into a war that is determined unwinnable 
from the start—it would simply be sending men and women to slaughter. In 
promoting this principle to the public, leaders must argue that they very likely to 
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win. They may do this by pointing to past military successes, boasting about their 
arsenals and military capabilities, and pointing out the enemy’s weaknesses. In 
the Vice Presidential debate, Biden stated: “With regard to the ability of the 
United States to take action militarily, it is—it is not in my purview to talk about 
classified information. But we feel quite confident we could deal a serious blow to 
the Iranians.” During the State of the Union address in 2013 Obama said, “Our 
brave men and women in uniform, tempered by the flames of battle, are 
unmatched in skill and courage,” and “As long as I’m Commander-in-Chief. . .we 
will maintain the best military the world has ever known.” In his speech to AIPAC, 
Panetta recounted the many ways in which the United States and Israel are 
prepared for military action. After listing a number of threats the United States 
and Israel face, including “the threat from Iran,” Panetta declared: “The 
cornerstone of this unprecedented defense cooperation is our commitment to 
maintain and expand Israel’s qualitative military edge. This is an ironclad pledge 
which says that the United States will provide whatever support is necessary for 
Israel to maintain military superiority over any state or coalition of states, as well 
as non-state actors” (“Defense Secretary”). Clearly, the Obama administration 
believes in the military might of the United States. Further, Obama points out 
Iran’s weaknesses in the third Presidential debate. He declares, “Iran is at its 
weakest point economically, strategically, militarily, than in many years” 
(“Remarks by the President and Governor Romney”). He also states: “We then 
organized the strongest coalition and the strongest sanctions against Iran in 
history, and it is crippling their economy. Their currency has dropped 80 
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percent. Their oil production has plunged to the lowest level since they were 
fighting a war with Iraq 20 years ago. So their economy is in shambles.” The 
Administration’s emphasis on the readiness and lethality of our military and the 
weakened state of Iran work to establish the principle of likelihood of success.  
 Each of the Just War Theory principles—legitimate authority, just cause, 
right intention, last resort, proportionality, and likelihood of success—work 
together to serve as a framework for establishing the morality of war. Leaders 
can build public support for military conflict if each of these principles is 
addressed and the morality of the war thereby established. My examination of 
official-level rhetoric shows that the Obama administration has sought to 
construct, through language, the morality of potential military conflict with Iran. 
The Administration has depicted Iran’s government as illegitimate. US leaders 
have assumed the justness of their cause. Obama has deferred to congress to 
ensure that the intention of the US is legal and morally just. Members of the 
Administration have established that any military action would be a last resort. 
Recognizing the difficulty of establishing the principle of proportionality, Obama 
has sought to skirt the issue by using alternative methods of combat. Finally, US 
leaders promote the strength and power of the US military while simultaneously 
pointing out the weaknesses of its foe. 
 Having made the case for morality, Obama may be able to gain enough 
support for the public to back him were he to make the decision to mobilize 
against Iran. It is impossible to predict what may happen to push the US into 
conventional warfare with Iran, but the President has gone a long way toward 
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ensuring public support should he choose to do so. There is another player, 
however, which may have as much or more impact than the Obama 
administration on American perceptions of the reality of the situation between the 
US and Iran. The news media—including the traditional or “mainstream” media in 
addition to new media designed to reach internet audiences—is another driver of 
public opinion. US leaders want to influence media coverage in order to promote 
their agendas to the American people. The media, however, in their effort to 
increase profits, also attempt to control the narrative. In the next section I will 
explore the relationship between presidential rhetoric, the media, and public 
opinion. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR: OFFICIAL-LEVEL RHETORIC, THE MEDIA, AND 
PUBLIC OPINION 
 
 Without myth-evoking rhetoric, government, military, and corporate 
leaders would not be able to sway public opinion to gain popular support for war 
and other projections of military might. In the case of pervasive political myths 
such as the myth of inevitable military conflict with Iran, leaders may use 
language to sustain and exploit existing prejudices and established “truths” to the 
same effect. In order to achieve their ends, governments, particularly 
governments of democratic societies, must convince those they govern that 
military action is both morally permissible and necessary for protecting the 
nation. The less tenable the motivations for military might as a solution to a 
nation’s problems, the more persuasive and pervasive the rhetoric must be. But, 
argues Matthew A. Baum and Tim J. Groeling in their book War Stories: The 
Causes and Consequences of Public Views of War (2010), “the true nature and 
extent of elite debate may matter less than media coverage of any such debate 
and the partisan makeup of the debaters, and that this is the case well beyond 
the short-term or ‘rally period’ of a foreign policy crisis or conflict” (9). Leaders 
can rarely rely on direct persuasion as a method of social control and power. 
Except for infrequent cases in which political leaders directly address the 
American public, such as State of the Union addresses and political debates, 
much of the official-level rhetoric to which Americans are exposed is filtered 
through the news media. In this section I will explore how presidential rhetoric 
and the media work together to influence public opinion, and how public opinion, 
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in turn, creates the foundational cultural context whereby foreign policy is 
legitimized. 
 Nations may enter into military conflict for a number of reasons, including 
self-defense, protecting allies, projecting might to gain more influence in a region, 
to acquire resources, to promote the nation’s values and ideals, or to counter an 
opposing ideology. Obama’s language, as I discussed previously, indicates that 
he would engage in a military conflict with Iran only reluctantly. But his rhetoric 
concerning Iran has become much more hawkish over the course of his 
presidency—perhaps to solidify his base of support domestically, or perhaps 
indicating that he is attempting to garner public support in case the US is drawn 
into war. In order for military engagement of any kind with Iran to be legitimized, 
Obama must have the public behind him. Even if he does not wish a military 
conflict with Iran, consolidating popular support now will give him the flexibility to 
act in the future.  
 There are cases when presidents can engage militarily without public 
support. Obama’s infamous “kill list,” his list of potential terrorists authorized for 
targeted killing, is an example of a president using his position to authorize 
military operations without the consent of the American public. Further, Obama’s 
policy on targeted killing is not subject to congressional oversight. So why would 
Obama bother cultivating public support for a potential military conflict with Iran to 
begin with? Could he just declare war without public support? Declaring war on 
Iran is a much larger undertaking than ordering drone strikes against a localized 
target. A war with Iran would require mobilization of thousands of troops, drain 
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billions form an already struggling US economy, and would probably result in a 
lot of US military and Iranian civilian deaths. Americans are weary from more 
than a decade of war. With the stakes so high, Obama would need public support 
for a war with Iran, in the case that military conflict was required. No matter what 
tactics a president uses to win public support, the influence of the media on 
public opinion must be considered.  
 
THE MEDIA: A PRESIDENT’S BEST FRIEND/WORST ENEMY 
 
 
 Few Americans have traveled to Iran, and most have little opportunity to 
converse with people from that country. So, Americans get most of their 
information about Iran either through official-level rhetoric or through the media. 
The 2012 presidential debates offered Americans an opportunity to hear directly 
from President Obama and his challenger, Mitt Romney, concerning their views 
on Iran. The third presidential debate, which took place on October 23, 2012, 
focused almost exclusively on US foreign policy. In the debate, both candidates 
expressed that Iran poses a great threat to America. Early on in the debate, 
Romney states directly that “Iran is the greatest national security threat we face” 
(“Remarks by the President and Governor Romney”). Obama’s first mention of 
the country, which he simply refers to as “the Iranian threat,” presents a logical 
fallacy (“Remarks by the President and Governor Romney”). The statement 
presupposes that Iran is a threat without offering any evidence to support the 
proposition.  
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 The third presidential debate offered an opportunity for official-level 
rhetoric to directly reach the American people, and that rhetoric may have played 
a role in shifting American perceptions of Iran as a “threat to America.” A 
president, just by speaking publicly about an issue, can bring that issue from 
obscurity to light, placing the issue firmly on the national agenda. A potential 
military conflict with Iran was a hot topic during the debate. But presidential 
rhetoric alone is not always enough to cause such a dramatic shift in a nation’s 
perceptions. The media is just as, if not more, powerful when it comes to 
influencing public opinion. In “International Coverage, Foreign Policy, and 
National Image: Exploring the Complexities of Media Coverage, Public Opinion, 
and Presidential Agenda” (2012), Cui Zhang and Charles William Meadows III 
argue that “the news media is a diplomatic device as powerful as formal policy 
statements” (89). In their study the authors find evidence to support their 
hypothesis that there is a correlation between negative news coverage, public 
opinion, and the rhetorical content of presidential public papers. The authors 
argue that the media plays a significant role in shaping the way Americans 
perceive foreign countries, particularly when those countries receive negative 
news coverage. They found that out of fifteen countries, the negative coverage 
that Iran receives is greater than that of any other.  
 Political scientists have noted a rise in negative coverage of news stories 
in the media. John G. Geer, in “The News Media and the Rise of Negativity in 
Presidential Campaigns” (2012), offers an explanation for this increase in 
negativity, particularly as it relates to attack ads in presidential campaigns. He 
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attributes the rise to the way journalists cover news stories, what has come to be 
called “interpretive journalism.” Over the last forty years the focus of journalism 
has shifted from that of description to interpretation. Instead of simply describing 
stories, the professionalization of journalism has led reporters to analyze and 
interpret news stories. This shift has exacerbated the conflict between 
presidential candidates and the news media over who commands public attention 
and thereby controls the narrative. Geer states that “The news media are not just 
reflecting the goings on of campaigns. Instead, their coverage has altered the 
conduct of campaigns. They do more than cover the process; they shape it” (426, 
emphasis mine). The implications of Geer’s analysis extend beyond political 
attack ads. From coverage of news events to the presidential debates, the media 
plays a role in shaping the way the public perceives other nations and America’s 
foreign policy, thereby influencing public opinion.  
 Journalists rely on conflict to make their news stories exciting. Exciting 
news stories lead to more viewers and increased income from advertisers. That 
the media sensationalizes news stories is a well-known phenomenon, but the 
effects of sensationalizing conflict can have important consequences. As Baum 
and Groeling note, “whether or not the public will rally behind a president when 
he takes the nation to war turns, at least in part, on the strategic interests and 
preferences of the news media” (108). Now I will turn to an example to 
demonstrate Baum and Groeling’s point.  
 In early July 2012 Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, Brigadier General of the Islamic 
Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force, warned on the Al Alam News 
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Channel that an attack by the US or Israel against Iran would degenerate into a 
third world war. The Iranian general announced that in the case of a strike 
against the Republic, Iran possessed the capability of retaliating against US 
military bases in the region. The story was quickly picked up by American news 
agencies.  
 Fox News reported the story on July 4, 2012, with the headline: “Iran 
Threatens Swift Retaliation on US Bases” (“Iran Threatens”). The first paragraph 
reads, “Iran declared Wednesday that it can destroy nearby U.S. military bases 
and strike Israel within minutes of an attack on the Islamic Republic, reflecting 
tensions over Iran's suspect nuclear program.” First, “Iran declares” makes the 
story sound like it was an official proclamation from the government of Iran 
instead of an unofficial announcement on a Tehran-based news network which 
has as one of its stated objectives “To adopt an active media policy vis-à-vis 
west’s one-sided news imperialism” (“About Us”). The Fox article focuses on the 
potential destruction of US military bases but never questions why there are over 
35 military bases surrounding Iran in the first place. The article refers to the 
General’s statement as a “veiled threat,” but apparently does not consider the 
bases surrounding Iran to be a threat to the Islamic Republic. The article goes on 
to state, “Israel and the U.S. have hinted at the possibility of military strikes 
against Iran if sanctions and diplomacy do not rein in Iran's nuclear development 
program.” Again, here the threat is still coming from Iran, but the US and Israel 
only “hint at the possibility” of strikes against Iran, and then only if “sanctions and 
diplomacy do not rein in” a nuclear program which may or may not be used for 
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the production of WMDs, encouraging the myth of inevitable conflict that the US 
and Israel have no choice but to attack if sanctions and diplomacy do not work. 
The article lists a number of reasons why Iran is a threat, including an Iranian 
military drill and the test-firing of an Iranian anti-ship missile. Further, the article 
mentions a few American and Israeli sites that could potentially be hit by Iranian 
weapons. It is clear that Fox News is not investigating the reasons for the Iranian 
General’s statements, attempting to understand and explain why the nation feels 
threatened and feels the need to make such statements, but instead focuses on 
the potential conflict that the comments suggest. Conflict sells.  
 CBS News also reported the story with the headline: “Iran Reports: War 
Games Showed Missile Accuracy” (“Iran Reports”). Again, this article illustrated 
the threat posed by Iran. Here is a list of statements in the article which suggest 
Iran’s military might:  
• “War games this month showcased missiles with improved 
accuracy and firing capabilities.” 
• “The targets were models of foreign military bases, and the stated 
goal was to show that Iran's missiles can hit Western bases and 
Israel.” 
• “90 percent of the missiles hit their targets and said this showed 
their increased accuracy.” 
 “Another achievement, the reports said, was Iran's capability of firing 
multiple missiles within seconds. The media reports said this would create a 
challenge for the U.S. or Israel to intercept incoming missiles should a war break 
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out.” Notice that it says, “should a war break out.” Iran’s leaders have argued that 
the military drills are to prepare for retaliation in the case of a US or Israeli strike. 
 “Iran's Revolutionary Guard commanders said during the war games that 
the tests were a ‘response to the political impoliteness of those who talk about all 
options being on the table.’” As I discussed previously, the phrase “all options on 
the table” is a euphemism for potential US military attacks against Iran. The 
sensationalism in this news report portrays Iran as the hostile aggressor and the 
US and Israel as the potential victims, in spite of the fact that were the situation 
to unfold as indicated, Iran would be responding to an American or Israeli 
preventive attack. And like the Fox News report, the CBS news story does not 
seek to seriously understand and report why Iran is demonstrating its military 
capabilities.   
 Though the story that appeared on ABC News had the most inflammatory 
headline, “Iran: We Can Hit 35 US Bases in ‘Minutes’” (Ferran), the report was 
more even-handed than the Fox or CBS reports. Though Fox and CBS offered a 
few feeble caveats suggesting that Iran is thumping its chest only to deter an 
attack from the US, ABC goes a bit farther, even quoting Brigadier General 
Hossein Salami who stated on Iranian television that “the main aim of the drill 
‘was to demonstrate the Iranian nation's political resolve to defend [its] vital 
values and national interests.’”  
 Taken together, these three news stories may contribute to a sense of fear 
in the American public. They suggest that Iran is a threat to the US and its 
interests and do little to explore the reasons for the increased hostility between 
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the US and Iran. Such interpretations may strengthen in the minds of the 
American public the Just War principles of just cause, last resort, and right 
intention. If Iran is bumping up its military capabilities, the US may have a just 
cause for attacking the country. By tying together the buildup of Iran’s arsenal 
with Iran’s nuclear program, the media may be encouraging Americans to 
interpret any US-led attack against Iran as a last resort. And through the media’s 
showcasing the belligerence of the Iranian generals, Americans may be left 
thinking that the US would have the right intention in invading Iran. Hyping Iran’s 
military achievements could be seen to diminish America’s likelihood of success, 
but this, in turn, may help build public support for increased US military spending 
and maintaining US military forces in the region. Clearly, the media play an 
important role in building upon and strengthening US Just War rhetoric.   
 My analysis of the above news story represents only one instance of the 
persuasive effects of news media interpretation. I have included it here as an 
example of the ways in which the news media may help shape public perceptions 
of events, thereby contributing to increased public support for military conflict with 
Iran. Whether or not that conflict arises depends upon the direction the Obama 
administration will take over the coming year. In the next section I will consider 
two potential paths down which Obama may take us. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: PEACE AND WAR 
 
 Over the course of his first term as president, Obama put in place 
sanctions that are far harsher than anything put forth under the Bush 
Administration. It will be interesting to see where relations between the US and 
Iran go from here. At a security conference in Munich on February 2, 2013, Vice-
President Joe Biden offered evidence that the Obama administration is still 
willing to consider direct negotiations with Iran (Biden). When asked specifically 
whether the time has come for direct US-Iran talks, Biden responded by saying 
“we would be prepared to meet bilaterally with the Iranian leadership.” But he 
also provided a warning: “There is still time, there is still space for diplomacy, 
backed by pressure, to succeed. The ball is in the government of Iran’s court.” 
The pressure Biden is referring to is the isolation and the socio-economic 
deprivation caused by international sanctions, which he called “the most robust 
sanctions in history.” By stating that “the ball is in the government of Iran’s court,” 
Biden is shifting responsibility for the isolation and deprivation from the 
governments imposing the sanctions to the government suffering under the 
sanctions. This type of doublespeak runs throughout Biden’s comments, making 
it unclear exactly where the Obama administration stands. After boasting about 
the isolating effects of the sanctions, Biden states, “President Obama has made 
clear to Iranian leaders, our policy is not containment—it is not containment.” If 
being shut off from the international community is not containment, I am not sure 
what is. Concerning placing responsibility on the Iranian government for the 
effects of the sanctions, Biden goes further: “we’ve also made clear that Iran’s 
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leaders need not sentence their people to economic deprivation and international 
isolation.” Again, he does not acknowledge the role the US and the international 
community played in bringing about these sanctions. By neglecting to 
acknowledge this fact Biden essentially blames the victim, making the suffering 
of the Iranian people out to be the effects of a decision made by the Iranian 
government, which is surely complicit but not wholly responsible. Ultimately, 
Biden’s comments show that the US position has not changed that much in the 
last couple of years, offering the option of negotiations while simultaneously 
imposing devastating sanctions.  
 There may still yet be hope, however, for avoiding war with Iran. The 
makeup of the Obama administration has recently gone through a period of 
transition, and key positions, including the Secretary of State and Secretary of 
Defense, have been filled with people who appear to be less hawkish than their 
predecessors. John Kerry has been confirmed as Secretary of State, replacing 
Hillary Clinton who, on “Good Morning America” during the 2008 Democratic 
primaries stated, “I want the Iranians to know that if I'm the president, we will 
attack Iran [if it attacked Israel]” (“Obama: Clinton’s ‘Obliterate’”). She went on to 
say that “In the next ten years, during which they might foolishly consider 
launching an attack on Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them.”  
 John Kerry, on the other hand, took a quite different approach to the issue 
of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In an interview with the Financial Times in 2009, 
shortly before the Iranian election which saw Ahmadinejad rise to power, then 
Senator Kerry blasted the Bush administration’s policy of zero enrichment and 
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claimed that Iran has “a right to peaceful nuclear power and to enrichment in that 
purpose” (Dombey). Trita Parsi, in A Single Roll of the Dice, adds that “the White 
House quickly contacted Kerry after the interview had been published and 
impressed on him not to repeat any such statements—even though Kerry’s point 
did not contradict the White House’s new policy” (59). In his confirmation 
hearings before his nomination to the position of Secretary of State earlier this 
year, however, Kerry cautiously sought to show that he is in step with Obama’s 
position toward Iran. Though he insisted that diplomacy is still possible with Iran, 
Kerry repeated the key Obama refrains: “We will do what we must to prevent Iran 
from obtaining a nuclear weapon” and “Our policy is not containment” (Cassata). 
Though Kerry appears to have taken a step back from his earlier position in 
which he argued for Iran’s right to nuclear enrichment, Kerry may prove to be an 
influential player in US-Iran relations over the coming years, perhaps helping to 
guide the US toward more direct diplomacy.  
 Another change in Obama’s administration that may change the nature of 
US-Iran relations is Obama’s pick for Secretary of Defense, Republican Chuck 
Hagel. During the confirmation hearings Hagel has faced much scrutiny over his 
positions on Iran, most of which came from fellow Republicans who worry over 
Hagel’s position on Israel. In an opinion piece written for the Washington Post in 
January of this year, Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK) announced his opposition to 
Hagel for the position, citing Hagel’s vote against a bill calling for further 
sanctions against Iran in 2001, Hagel’s support for Iran’s membership in the 
World Trade Organization, and Hagel’s multiple attempts to push for direct 
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negotiations with Iran (Inhofe). But, like Kerry, Hagel took a much tougher stance 
on Iran during the confirmation process. From his statement in 2008 that “The 
United States should open a new strategic direction in U.S.-Iran relations by 
seeking direct, comprehensive and unconditional talks with the government of 
Iran,” Hagel reportedly took a more hawkish tone on Iran, suggesting that, were 
diplomacy to fail, he is willing to resort to military conflict (Sanger and Shanker).  
 It is unlikely to be coincidence that Obama’s picks for Secretary of State 
and Secretary of Defense are two men who have in the past favored direct 
diplomacy and reduced sanctions on Iran. These changes to Obama’s cabinet 
may be a sign that Obama wants to return to his earlier position regarding Iran, 
or perhaps signals a shift in a new direction altogether. But no matter how willing 
the US is to enter direct negotiations with Iran, no talks can take place without a 
similar sentiment from the Islamist Republic. An event will take place this 
summer which could change everything—the Iranian presidential election. Under 
current Iranian election law, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is not eligible to run for a 
third consecutive term. Ahmadinejad, however, is not known for playing by the 
rules. Internal discord has plagued the president’s administration, and there are 
fears that the election scheduled for June 14, 2013, could incite another round of 
bloody demonstrations similar to those in 2009 (Tabaar). Whatever happens, it is 
possible that the outcome of the Iranian presidential elections could impact the 
stance of the Obama administration and change the nature of US-Iran relations. 
  Foreign policy professionals are at odds over the best way to go forward 
with Iran. In his article “Time to Attack Iran” (2012), Matthew Kroenig, a Fellow at 
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the Council on Foreign Relations, argues for a “preemptive” strike against Iran’s 
nuclear facilities. He believes that strategic strikes aimed at the facilities would 
reduce civilian casualties, delay Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon, and 
ultimately bolster America’s influence in the region. Kroenig argues that the risk 
of an all-out war with Iran is preferable to an Iran armed with a nuclear weapon. 
On the other side, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former national security advisor to 
Jimmy Carter, argues that a war with Iran would not be worth the costs in terms 
of lives, American influence in the region, and the economic drain of another 
protracted war. He argues instead that “[a] more prudent and productive course 
for the United States would be to continue the painful sanctions against Iran 
while formally adopting for the Middle East” a policy which holds that “[a]n Iranian 
military threat aimed at Israel or any other U.S. friend in the Middle East would be 
treated as if directed at the United States itself and would precipitate a 
commensurate U.S. response” (Brzezinski). It remains to be seen which course 
the Obama administration will take in the coming months and years.  
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CONCLUSION 
  
 The study of political rhetoric is important because, as I have argued, 
mythological narratives and language structures inform foreign and military 
policy. Understanding political rhetoric, how it relates to public support for military 
conflict, which in turn shapes policy, may offer insights into how military conflict 
can be prevented in the future. There may be cases in which military conflict may 
be the most ethical approach to a given situation in a given context. I believe, 
however, that citizens of a democracy are responsible for the actions of their 
government, and we therefore have an obligation to inquire into the way leaders 
seek to influence our support for their actions. It is my hope that this small 
contribution may lead to a greater awareness of the ways in which official-level 
rhetoric is used to garner public support with which US military action is 
legitimized. 
 Through an exploration of the rhetoric of the Obama administration, I have 
attempted to demonstrate how rhetoric informs the American public’s perceived 
reality of the situation between the US and Iran. I have shown how rhetorical 
strategies can be implemented to create symbols and heuristic cues with which 
to guide America perceptions. I have shown how political myths, such as the 
myth of the inevitability of military conflict with Iran, allow leaders to establish and 
reinforce narratives, narratives which encourage the public to interpret the 
meaning of events in the way leaders want the people to understand them. My 
examination of the Obama administration’s rhetoric in light of Just War Theory 
exposes the method through which a war with Iran could be portrayed by the 
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Administration as ethically justified. Finally, my exploration of the relationship 
between official-level rhetoric, the media, and public opinion exposes the many 
layers through which information and meaning are created and shared. 
 Almost daily in writing this thesis I came across new news stories and 
developments in relation to Iran. We live in a precarious world; by the time this 
thesis goes to print the situation between the US and Iran may have changed 
entirely. Continued study of this topic is necessary to continue to track the 
evolving nature of official-level rhetoric and public support for war. Israel’s role in 
US-Iranian foreign policy cannot be overstated. Israel’s relationship to the US 
and to Iran should be more carefully explored to flesh out the context in which the 
above analysis takes place. Further, to make this analysis more comprehensive, 
rhetorical analysis should be performed using the language of the speakers. If, 
as Booth believes, war can be rhetorically constructed between two nations, as 
the war in Iraq was constructed by the rhetoric of both the Bush administration 
and Saddam Hussein, this rhetorical analysis presents a one-sided argument at 
best. My analysis has only looked at the rhetoric on the American side of the 
issue. Further study should include the rhetoric of Iran and Israel. I am prevented 
from doing so because of my inability to read and speak Farsi and Hebrew. In a 
few instances I have relied on translations in this analysis, which is appropriate 
as the comments I analyzed pertained to American perceptions of Iranian and 
Israeli rhetoric. These perceptions were key in demonstrating the correlation 
between rhetoric, the media, and public opinion. However, further study should 
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include researchers with the ability to examine Iranian and Israeli rhetoric in their 
own languages.  
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